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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the unemployment 
insurance system and the labour market turnover trying to move further the traditional view that this 
system has only behavioral consequences from the labour supply side of the labour market. This 
study assumes heterogeneity in the impact of the incentives embedded in the unemployment 
insurance system, depending on the type of labour market transition (quits versus layoffs and recalls 
versus new job entrances) and the worker’s attachment to the labour market (gender and type of 
contract). The results show that unemployment benefits appear to favour job turnover and firms and 
workers´s decisions seem to matter on job turnover. The layoff hazard rate increases as workers 
qualify for unemployment benefits while the quit hazard rate remains stable. Similarly, employment 
inflow increases sharply after exhaustion of unemployment benefits. The timing and importance of 
the exit differs between recalls and new job entry and it depends on the worker’s attachment to the 
labour market. These differences also call into evidence that firm´s and worker´s decisions matter in 
the duration of unemployment.  
  
JEL Code: J63, J64, J65 
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance, Job Turnover, Multivariate Mix Proportional Hazard Models, Recall and Layoffs, 
Employment and Unemployment Duration 
 
The author would like to thank Jose Ignacio Garcia, Jan Van Ours and seminar participants at the Centro de Estudios 
Andaluces, FEDEA, ESPE-2009 and EEA-2010 for their helpful comments.  
 
* Dpto de Economía, Métodos Cuantitativos e Historia Económica. Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Carretera de Utrera 







   2
1 Introduction 
The labour market is in a constant state of flux. There is a continuous flow of workers into and out 
of employment, and from one job to another. Understanding job turnover is the key to 
understanding how the labour market operates. Turnover is necessary because it helps allocate 
workers to those jobs where they are most productive and allows employers to hire and fire 
according to economic conditions. It is not always optimal, however. Some groups of workers 
experience high layoff rates without ever advancing to better positions (Rebollo 2010; Gagliarducci, 
2005). And some groups of firms face high firing rates without improvements in their productivity 
levels
1 (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008; Bassanini et al. 2008). One of the factors that has been blamed 
for excessively high turnover in the labour market is the Unemployment Insurance System, (UIS) 
which is a key element of the social security systems of OECD countries. Nowadays several 
governments are reconsidering the design of the UIS, with the dual objectives of increasing 
employment and reducing social expenditure. Among the traditional reform proposals are the 
reduction in the replacement rate and/or the reduction in potential benefit duration. Nevertheless, 
uniform payroll taxes, the method used by most UIS to finance unemployment benefits, is 
frequently criticised for distorting firms’ layoff decisions because the absence of layoff taxes leads 
firms not to internalize the costs of insurance when dismissed workers enter unemployment and 
begin to receive benefits, and, by increasing labour costs, the presence of payroll taxes gives 
incentives to firms to lay workers off
2. This gives rise to too many layoffs reducing mean 
employment duration and increasing unemployment incidence (see Anderson and Meyer, 2000; 
Cahuc and Malherbet, 2004; Fath and Fuest, 2005; Blanchard and Tirole, 2008)
 3.  
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the potential relationships between the UIS and the 
labour market turnover trying to move further the traditional view that the UIS has only behavioural 
consequences from the labour supply side of the labour market. For this aim we analyse the Spanish 
labour market for the period 2000-2007. Several features distinguish the Spanish labour market 
from other European labour markets. Firstly, it has a generous UIS financed by uniform payroll 
taxes. Secondly, employment turnover is notably higher than in other European countries, with 
                                                 
1 A rise in the turnover rate decreases the probability of investing in specific human capital or receiving specific training at 
the firm and, therefore, may decrease labour productivity and Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
2 Because of these perverse financial incentives, some countries like Spain have put in place a system of employment 
protection based on heavy judicial intervention. In Spain, judges have the authority to decide whether a layoff is justified 
on economic grounds or not. 
3 Blanchard and Tirole, (2008) suggests that at least a partial shift from payroll to layoff taxes, accompanied by limits on 
judicial intervention, would lead to a better allocation. Firms, once forced to internalize the costs of unemployment 
insurance, are in a much better position than judges to assess whether layoffs are economically justified. Cahuc and 
Malherbet (2004), show that the inclusion of the experience rating increases employment and the welfare of low-skilled 
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recent figures showing that nearly 50% of workers have held their current job for six months or less 
and almost 30% for no more than a year. Thirdly, more than 80% of newly signed contracts are 
temporary, Spain’s temporary employment rate has remained above 30% since 1995 and is 
currently one of the highest in Europe. Fourthly, more than a third of the unemployed who find a 
job return to their former employer.  
The effects of UI benefits on job turnover compound labour supply and demand forces and their 
relative importance continues to be an empirical issue. A number of empirical studies have already 
examined how certain characteristics of the UIS play out with respect to the duration and outcome 
of unemployment spells. Typically, these studies focus on the behavioural consequences of the UIS 
on the labour supply side of the labour market and their findings show that higher replacement 
ratios lead to longer unemployment spells and that the probability of escaping unemployment 
increases as unemployment benefits entitlements are exhausted. Nevertheless, to understand 
whether demand or supply incentives are behind this effect the researcher must take into account 
whether the unemployment spell finally ends in recalls or in a new job entrance. The outcome of 
transition from unemployment –recall versus entry into a new job- may involve several different 
causal mechanisms, all requiring explicit consideration in the analysis of the effect of the UIS on 
job turnover (Katz, 1986, Juradja, 2002). The empirical relevance of this issue is doubtful in a 
country like Spain where more than a third of the unemployed who find a job return to their former 
employer. Besides, as Juradja (2002) has shown, evaluating the UIS based on only its effects on 
unemployment duration may result in underestimation of the total impact of the UIS on job turnover 
and hence on the unemployment rate. The influence of UIS eligibility parameters on employment 
duration, in contrast, has received scant attention and none of the empirical studies found take into 
account the potential behavioural differences between layoffs and quits. These distinctions between 
different types of employment inflow and outflow are key to determining whether the UIS also 
affects firms’ hiring and firing decisions (as implicit contract theory shows, see Feldstein, 1976) and 
not only workers’ decisions as assumed in traditional analysis. For instance, one could easily argue 
that layoffs are triggered by productivity shocks while quits are triggered by reservation wage 
shocks (Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). Finally, it is also important to remark that, though dynamic 
selection effects might be important in these types of analysis
4, few empirical papers take them into 
account.  
The aim of this paper is to offer a more comprehensive analysis of the potential effects of the UIS 
on job turnover trying to illustrate that demand and labour supply forces are both important. We 
                                                 








   4
depart from previous research in several dimensions. Firstly, we take into account dynamic 
potential selection effects. In particular, the analysis considers three distinct initial states: 
employment, involuntary unemployment, and voluntary unemployment. Secondly, we define a 
competing risk model for employment and unemployment spells as follows: within the state of 
employment, the analysis differentiates between quits (leading to voluntary unemployment) and 
layoffs (leading to involuntary unemployment). Within the involuntary unemployment state, we 
consider whether the spell ends in recall or the worker’s entry into a new firm. Within the voluntary 
unemployment state we only consider exit to employment since job quitters probably face zero 
recall expectations. Thirdly, given the strong duality of the Spanish labour market we allow for 
heterogeneous effects of the UIS system between permanent and temporary contracts.  
Although several dimensions of the UIS can affect the labour market, I shall concentrate on two of 
its key components: Entry Requirement (ER) and Potential Benefit Duration (PBD). The ER refers 
to the minimum number of weeks that individuals have to work over a specified period in order to 
qualify for UI benefits. The PBD refers to the maximum number of weeks the unemployed worker 
is entitled to draw UI benefits. Both parameters (ER and PBD) depend on the number of weeks 
worked over the six years prior to the onset of unemployment. The empirical method is to look for 
spikes in the employment and unemployment hazard profiles exploiting cross-sectional and 
longitudinal variation in ER and PBD, respectively, parameters. Given the strong duality of the 
Spanish labour market, we allow UIS parameters to differ between temporary and permanent 
contracts. Notice that, the influence of UI benefits on search behaviour and reservation wage policy 
might differ depending on the type of contract.  
Another key feature of this analysis is the use of an administrative dataset (Longitudinal Working 
Life Sample, LWLS) that allows to construct full employment histories and analyze the distribution 
of employment and unemployment durations as affected first by the ER and then by the PBD. The 
importance of using an administrative dataset in this type of analysis is large since it avoids the 
existence of seam bias
5, a serious problem for estimating duration models. 
In the present paper, we use a discrete-time multivariate hazard model –multiple spell and multiple 
states with competing risks- allowing for jointly-distributed unobserved heterogeneity. In order to 
take into account differences in labour supply decisions, the whole analysis is performed on 
separate gender groups. 
                                                 
5 With seam bias, transitions or changes in status within reference periods are underreported while too many transitions or 
changes are reported as occurring between reference periods. The seam bias is an important issue in duration models since 
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The analysis presented points to various behavioural consequences of the UIS on job turnover. 
Firstly, we obtain that employment inflow and outflow is influenced by the UIS varying the 
intensity of the effect by gender, type of contract and type of transition. In general, these effects 
stand out for workers with loose attachment to the labour market such as women and temporary 
workers. Secondly, we show that employers might play an important role in the timing of the layoff 
as well as in the timing of the outflow from unemployment. Thus, the layoff hazard rate increases 
when the worker qualifies for UI benefits, while job quit decisions remain unaffected. We also 
obtain sharp increases in the rate of escape from unemployment for unemployment recipients 
around the time that benefits run out. Interestingly, we find that the recall hazard rate reaches its 
maximum one month prior to the exhaustion of benefits for workers previously on permanent 
contracts. Meanwhile, the new job hazard rate reaches its maximum at the time UI benefits run out. 
In light of these findings, it can be concluded that the observed 'moral hazard' effects of the UIS on 
employment and unemployment duration cannot all be attributed to worker reactions alone. Note 
that the importance of these results resides in the discovery that the UIS tends to reduce the time an 
individual spends in employment throughout his or her labour market career.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the 
Spanish UIS and Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and the existing empirical literature. 
The data and the econometric model are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The results of 
the empirical analysis are given in Section 6. The conclusions of the study are summarized in the 
final section.  
2 Institutional  Background 
As in most OCDE countries, there are two basic types of unemployment benefits in Spain
6: 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) and Unemployment Assistance (UA). All employees who 
involuntarily become unemployed are entitled to UI benefits, provided that they were employed for 
at least 12 months over the 72-month period prior to unemployment. Individuals receiving full-time 
disability benefits, voluntary job quitters and anyone over the age of 65 are excluded from UI 
benefits. Benefits end when individuals cease to be unemployed or complete the maximum benefit 
period.
 The amount of income provided for the unemployed is determined by multiplying the gross 
replacement rate by the average basic pay over the 12 months preceding unemployment. The 
monthly payment is 70% of average basic pay for the first four months of benefits and 60% from 
the fifth month onwards. Unemployment insurance is also subject to a floor of 75% of the statutory 
                                                 







   6
minimum wage (SMW) and a ceiling of between 170% and 220% of the SMW depending on the 
worker’s family circumstances. The last two factors imply that the net replacement rate could be 
much higher than the gross rate quoted above. The potential benefit duration (PBD) and the amount 
of benefit received depend on previous employment duration and wage levels, respectively. These 
benefits last for a period of at least 4 months extendable in 2-monthly periods up to a maximum of 2 
years, depending on the worker’s employment record. For those who have been in work but not 
long enough to qualify for UI, or who have exhausted their UI benefits, UA benefits are available.  
Relative to the financing of the Spanish UIS, it is worth to point out that is financed by uniform 
payroll taxes. In particular, employers and employees both pay UI contributions. The government 
pays the balance outstanding. In the case of a permanent contract, the contribution rate is 7.55% 
(employees: 1.55%, employers: 6%). For fixed-term contracts, employees pay 1.6% and employers 
pay 6.7% for full-time work and 7.7% for part-time work or if the employer is a temporary job 
agency. 
During the sample period two labour market reforms took place in the Spanish labour market. They 
are relevant to be considered because these reforms introduced new exogenous variations in the 
assignment between temporary and permanent contracts in the period of study. For the 2001 reform, 
the most important aspect of the decree is that the prevailing programme of permanent employment 
promotion was extended to many new cases. The decree also introduced limited compensation for 
the dismissal of workers on temporary contracts, amounting to eight days' pay per year worked
7. 
However, the most important change was the abolition of the firm’s obligation to pay interim wages 
when dismissed workers appealed to labour courts, as long as the firm acknowledged the dismissal 
as being unfair and deposited the severance pay (45 days’ wages per year of service) in court within 
two days of the dismissal. In the 2006 reform new restrictions in the use of temporary contracts 
were introduced. For instance, this reform limited the repeated renewal of employment contracts 
within the same company by obliging companies to offer a permanent contract to any worker who 
has had two or more fixed-term contracts and has worked in the same job for over two years within 
a period of 30 months. The permanent employment promotion policy also suffered important 
changes. It created incentives to companies to provide permanent employment contracts and 
establish fixed quotas (instead of the former percentage of contributions) for the target groups for 
these incentives, namely women, young workers, disabled workers and persons on job training 
contracts; It provided a fixed yearly subsidy (with a maximum duration of three years) for 
                                                 
7 Considering that the average temporary contract is for less than six months, the compensation of four days' 
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temporary contracts that are converted into permanent contracts before 31 December 2006, and to 
allow temporary contracts prior to 2008 to be converted into permanent ones.  
3  The literature and debate on the UIS: 
The theoretical analysis of the potential effects of UI benefits on workers has traditionally focused 
on the exit rate from unemployment and has been based on job search models (Mortensen 1990). In 
this framework, higher benefits drive up the reservation wage and reduce job search effort, thus 
reducing the exit rate from unemployment and extending unemployment duration. Close to the time 
of benefit exhaustion the unemployment exit rate increases as the value of being unemployed 
declines, such that the marginal benefit from job-search increases and the reservation wage falls.  
The worker´s search intensity can depend, among other factors, on the expected probability of 
recall. Job offers are related to wage and type of contract. Summarizing, the determinants of 
unemployment duration depend on wage offered, type of contract, unemployment benefits and 
recall expectations.  
Although this disincentive effect of the UIS has been the conventional wisdom in modern labour 
economics, it might also depend on the type of unemployment, that is, whether it is due to a quit or 
a layoff and if the latter is the case, whether the unemployment spell ends up in recall or in new job 
entry. One could easily argue that layoffs are  triggered by productivity shocks while quits are 
triggered by reservation wage shocks
8 (Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). Similarly, while worker 
economic incentives embedded in the UIS are determinant in the search for a new job, firm 
incentives might play a significant role in the timing of recalls (Katz, 1986; Jensen and Nielsen, 
1999; Roed and Nordberg, 2003). Katz (1986) suggests that the UIS financed by uniform payroll 
taxes may increase the impact of unemployment through temporary layoff by allowing firms to lay 
off workers who are less likely to be lost to other employers. More recently, Jurajda (2003) 
developed a dynamic model of layoff and recall decisions, showing that they might both depend on 
the amount of unemployment remaining to the worker. The main interest of his theoretical approach 
is that it explicitly links the firm’s firing decisions with the probability of recall. The author 
assumes firms to be aware that unemployed workers with generous UI benefits will search less 
intensively than in an alternative scenario. In this scenario, he shows that in the presence of demand 
fluctuations and firm-specific human capital, the optimal strategy for the firm will be to lay off 
                                                 
8 It is true that there might be incentives to harass (actions by firms to induce workers they would like to lay off to quit 
instead), shirk (actions by workers to induce firms they would like to quit to lay them off instead), or cooperatively 
misreport. For instance, a worker with a positive probability of layoff, delaying a quit will provide the worker with a 
chance of getting laid off and obtaining UI coverage. All these actions will depend very much in each case on the 
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workers with high benefit entitlements and recall those approaching the expiry of their benefits.  All 
these arguments, motivates a separate analysis for quits versus layoffs and recalls versus new job 
entry in a multi-state competing risk duration model where employment and unemployment 
outflows are explicitly considered.  
Implicit contract models also offer a framework to understand the potential effects of the UIS on job 
turnover. These models describe the determinants of dismissals taking into account firm behaviour 
and were based on the idea that the relationship between workers and firms is defined through 
“implicit contracts” (Feldstein, 1976, 1978; Bailey, 1977; Burdett and Wright, 1989), due to the 
economic uncertainty faced by both parties. In these models, both workers and firms see the 
advantage of including temporary dismissals as part of the contract, because it enables them to hand 
over the cost of economic uncertainty to the UIS. Feldstein (1976) and Bailey (1977), support the 
idea that the greater the generosity of the UIS, the higher the unemployment rate due to temporary 
dismissals while Burdett and Wright (1989), using a more general model, conclude the opposite, 
that is, a more generous UIS may reduce the unemployment rate. The main shortcoming of these 
models is that they assume the worker to be strongly attached to the firm, thus inaccurately 
describing the search behaviour of the unemployed worker. Nevertheless, a main interest of these 
models is that they have been used to consider the consequence of experience rating on temporary 
layoffs. Generally, empirical analysis of experience rating yields support to Feldstein´s analysis 
(Topel, 1983; Anderson and Meyer, 1993, 2000)
9.  
Recently, new theoretical work has shown that the entitlement effects of the UIS might also differ 
by the nature of the job and the degree of worker´s attachment to the labour market. For instance, 
Boone and Van Ours (2009), present a theoretical model in which to explain the spike on the 
unemployment hazard rate at UI benefit exhaustion, one must take into account the type of contract. 
They propose a model where firm and workers are matched and then decide on the wage and the 
starting date of the job. They show that a delay in the starting date requested from the worker and 
linked to his potential unemployment UI benefit duration, generates a spike in the outflow rate. 
They argue that since permanent jobs are more stable, the firm´s propensity to accept the delay 
proposed by the worker will be higher than for a temporary job. Hence, spikes at benefit expiration 
should be larger when the new job is a permanent contract than when it is a temporary one.  
Notice that using Jurajda´s approach, one could also offer an alternative way of arguing that the 
timing of the recall could differ between permanent and temporary workers for the following. 
                                                 
9 Anderson and Meyer (2000) is of particular interest since the authors provide a detailed analysis of the 1984 Washington 
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Firstly, firm-specific human capital –the main argument behind the recall policy of firms in 
Jurajda´s model-, should be more relevant for a permanent worker. Secondly, notice that when the 
arrival rate of job offers for permanent workers is larger than for temporary ones
10, the influence of 
UI benefits on the individual reservation wage may be less negative if the offered job is permanent 
rather than temporary, given the likely higher utility attached to higher job stability of a permanent 
contract. In this framework, it can be optimal for the firm to recall the permanent worker before the 
exhaustion of UI benefits.  
Notice that this distinction might be relevant to explain differences in the timing of the recalls. The 
idea is that, since firms know that an unemployed worker who previously held a permanent contract 
faces a larger probability of receiving a job offer associated to a permanent contract they will not 
wait until exhaustion of UI benefits to recall the worker. 
The empirical literature describing the effects of UIS on unemployment and employment duration 
controlling for dynamic selection effects is rather limited due to the scarcity of large micro data sets 
with information on labour market histories and unemployment benefits. Typically, the analysis has 
focused on studying the effects of the UIS on unemployment duration and to a lesser extent on job 
duration. Common findings are that the hazard rate increases as unemployment benefits run out
11. 
For instance, Roed and Nordberg (2003) using Norwegian data show that the recall hazard rate 
increases by a factor of 3.5 when UI benefits are fully exhausted, compared to a situation with at 
least 7 months left of these subsidies. Meyer (1990) analyses administrative unemployment 
insurance records from the Continuous Wage and Benefit History database and find that the 
unemployment exit rate is 2 times the exit rate one month before benefit expiration. Katz and Meyer 
(1990) using the same data but supplemented with telephone interviews find that the job finding 
rates in the exhaustion week are 2.2-2.3 times the usual job finding rate, both for recalls and new 
jobs. Boone and Van Ours (2009) obtain that the job finding rate concerning permanent jobs in a 
month of benefit expiration is about 3 times as high for males and 3.7 times as high for females as 
in the same month without benefit exhaustion. For the case of transitions to temporary contracts, 
they find spikes which are about 50% (males) and 75% (females) higher than regular job finding 
rates. For the Spanish economic, Alba-Ramirez et al (2007) investigate exists from unemployment 
of benefit recipients in Spain and obtained that recall and new job hazard rates increase around the 
time benefits run out.  
                                                 
10 Bover and Gómez (2004) find that in Spain exit rates to temporary jobs are ten times larger than exit rates to permanent 
jobs, though this difference decreases with unemployment duration. 
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The empirical evidence for the potential impact of UIS on employment spells is sparse and based on 
estimates of whether long unemployment periods financed with unemployment benefits might 
increase job match quality by allowing individuals to wait for better job offers
12. Little empirical 
research, in contrast, has focused on the direct impact of UIS on the timing of layoff decisions and 
hence on employment duration. Christofides and McKenna (1996), Green and Ridell (1997), Baker 
and Rea (1998) and Green and Sargent, (1998) used employment hazards to study Canadian UIS 
incentives in job spell duration. They all find that entry requirements variations in the UIS have a 
significant impact on employment durations. In particular, Baker and Rea (1998) find a significant 
increase in the employment hazard rate (varying from 1.4 to almost 2 times depending on the model 
estimation) in the week the worker qualifies for UI benefits
13. Only in Jurajda (2002) we find a joint 
estimation of the effects of the UIS on both unemployment inflow and outflow employing a data set 
of labour market histories of displaced US workers. He finds that although entitlement to UI 
benefits significantly increases the layoff hazard, the quit hazard is not affected by any of the UIS 
parameters. 
These papers point that the effects of UI benefits on employment and unemployment duration are 
important and they might compound labour supply and demand forces. This paper extends the 
existing literature by analyzing the effect of the UI on labour market transitions considering quits 
versus layoffs as the reason for entry into unemployment and recall versus new job acceptance as 
the means of exit from unemployment. Moreover, it takes into account one important singularity of 
the Spanish labour market, i.e the strong segmentation due to the existence of temporary and 
permanent contracts.  
4  The Data and descriptive statistics 
The analysis is based on individual data from the Social Security records called the Longitudinal 
Working Lives Sample (for a detailed description of this sample, see Duran, 2007 and García-Perez, 
2008). The LWLS, which is compiled annually, consists of a sample of over one million worker 
case-histories. The initial sample includes all individuals who came into contact with the Social 
                                                 
12 So far, this literature has failed to provide any overwhelming evidence that the UIS actually improves job matches 
(Belzil 2001; Centeno 2004 ; Van Ours and Vodopivec,2008; Caliendo, et al 2009) 
13  One branch of the  empirical literature of the UIS effects on layoff behaviour has been motivated by imperfect 
experience rating and has tended to use cross-sectional data. However, longitudinal data offer a better framework for the 
analysis of this effect since, UI benefit entitlement, which may also affect the decision to lay off workers, varies over the 
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Security system at least once between 2005 and 2008
14. This database provides highly detailed 
information about their past and present labour activities, including monthly wage, type of contract 
receipt of UI benefits, and reasons for job termination, as well as several characteristics of the hiring 
firms, such as size, age, ownership, location and sector of activity. Individual characteristics such as 
age, gender and nationality are also present in the database.  
The characteristics that make the LWLS relevant for this study are several. Firstly, it is an 
administrative dataset which provides high accurate information on employment and unemployment 
transitions; The data do not only cover the period when workers were covered by unemployment 
benefits but also the period of transition from unemployment to employment after benefits run out.  
Notice that a main disadvantage of other administrative datasets used in this type of analysis is that 
unemployment is truncated at the point benefits run out. Thus, Card et al. (2007) point that the 
incidence of potential benefit duration on the unemployment exit rate is conditional on the way the 
researcher measures the end-of-benefit spike phenomenon. In particular, he points out that this 
effect is notably lower when the researcher measures the incidence of UIS on employment entrance 
than when she measures the incidence on unemployment outflow and the unemployment spell is 
censored at exhaustion of UI benefits.  
Secondly, the possibility of viewing the entire labour market history of each worker enables 
identification of the point at which the employee qualifies for UI benefits and hence computation of 
her potential benefit duration when unemployed. The resulting multiple-period, event history data 
set is unusually rich in terms of the variation of entitlement and unemployment benefit levels.  
Thirdly, the database assigns each job spell with an employer identification code, thus enabling the 
detection of recalls versus new job entrances; fourthly, since the reasons for the separation are 
known, it is possible to distinguish layoffs from quits;  
We track each employment/unemployment spell to the point of transition or to the end of the 
observation period. For employment spells, in the case of a transition to another job with no 
intervening spell of unemployment, for sake of simplicity, the spell is treated as censored. Each 
uncensored job spell is identified either as a layoff or a quit
15 using the reasons of ending the 
contract provided by the database. Following the competing alternatives defined for the 
employment spell, we sort the pool of unemployed into involuntary unemployment (due to a layoff) 
and voluntary unemployment (due to a quit). All unemployment spells lasting beyond the end of 
                                                 
14 Currently, the social security system offers five samples for the years between 2004 and 2008. For the purposes of this 
paper, the four most recent databases were merged (LWLS, 2005-2008) and omitted the LWLS -2004, since the 
information it offers barely differs from that available for subsequent years. 
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2007, which is the last observation in the calendar, are treated as right censored. Here, we are only 
interested in job finding rates. Hence, a terminated spell of unemployment is identified as a recall or 
entrance into a new firm using the firm code provided by the dataset.  
We measure the duration of each contract in months based on the specified start and end dates. 
Likewise, we compute the duration of each spell of unemployment by measuring the time lapse 
between the end date of the worker’s previous contract and the start date of the new one. To avoid 
odd behaviour in the estimated baseline hazard functions due to the sparsity of observations at 
longer durations, we right-censored any observed spells of unemployment longer than or equal to 
18 months
16 and any observed spell of employment longer than or equal to 37 months.  
We draw individual UI claim histories from the full labour market histories. We identify the exact 
month of employment in which the individual qualifies for UI benefits by combining the data on 
duration of employment and duration of previous unemployment receiving these benefits according 
to the rules laid out in the Spanish UIS. These state that UI benefits recommence at the end of any 
preceding benefit claim as long as it has been exhausted. The database includes the date of the last  
UI benefit claim thus enabling us to determine the number of weeks of insured employment already 
accumulated at the start of an employment spell. The PBD, that is, the maximum number of months 
the employee is entitled to UI benefits when unemployed is computed analogously. In both cases, 
we allow for benefits ceasing when a new job is found. It is important to highlight that the richness 
of the dataset reduces measurement errors to a negligible level.   
The final data used in the present analysis include all observed and recorded spells of employment 
(not including self- employment) and unemployment of Spanish workers aged between 18 and 55 
over the period 2000-2007
17. Table 1 provides a descriptive overview of the events record, with the 
sample split into three groups by labour market status: employment, involuntary unemployment 
(due to a layoff) and voluntary unemployment (due to a quit). A key point to note is that the 
majority of the uncensored employment spells are layoffs: 75% for male workers and 80% for 
females. Between 34% (males) and 44% (females) of involuntary unemployment spells end in 
recall. Hence, the data reveal that the probability of layoff and the probability of recall are both 
important and greater for female than for male workers. It is also worth noting that mean duration of 
unemployment is shorter for laid off workers returning to the same firm than it is for the rest. For 
instance, the average duration of unemployment is 3.4 for female workers who are temporarily laid 
off and 5.3 for those who move to a different firm. This might be the first evidence that the 
                                                 
16 Notice that transitions from unemployment to inactivity are not identified in the sample.  
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behavioural impact of UI on time spent unemployed might differ with the type of transition, 
because firms’ hiring decisions also matter, especially in the case of recall transitions.   
Finally, the percentage of job quitters eventually re-entering employment is higher than of laid off 
workers. Though it is not shown in the Table, is also interesting to note that around only 5% of 
these transitions involve a return to the previous firm. This observation is important, since it 
highlights the uniqueness of this part of the unemployment sample and its need for special treatment 
in the econometric model. 
Though not shown, it is important to note that on average workers experience three employment 
spells and four unemployment spells within the sample frame. These individuals have lower than 
average durations of both unemployment and employment spells. The existence of this group of 
workers suggests the possibility of substantial unobserved heterogeneity correlated across spells and 
states affecting the selection into multiple spells. Such dynamic sample selection fact may 
correlated unobserved heterogeneity with the UIS variables because eligibility rules make UIS 
variables depend on worker´s labour market histories. This issue will be considered in the 
econometric analysis.  
4.1  Main Descriptive Statistics: some stylized facts 
Figure 1 plots the outflow from employment taking into account the competing risks described 
previously and as a function of elapsed duration of employment. The trend differences between 
layoffs versus quits are very clear; hence, the need to estimate them separately. The layoff profile 
shows spikes at certain contract durations
18 (3, 6, 9 and 12 months), the sharpest taking place at 
month 12.   
To offer some hint of the UI qualifying effects on job exit rates, the following Figure 2 depicts the 
layoff and quit outflow rates taking into account the individual heterogeneity in the UI benefit-
qualifying periods. Recall that people enter employment spells with different labour histories and 
have therefore accumulated different numbers of weeks of insured unemployment from past 
spells
19. Layoff and quit employment outflows are depicted for two different cases: the first for 
workers having started the current contract with zero months’ entitlement to UI benefits (i.e., 
having exhausted previously earned benefits); the second, for workers starting the current job spell 
with a positive number of months’ entitlement to benefits (i.e., after a job-to-job transition). By 
                                                 
18 Previous empirical evidence has already shown that these peaks mainly involve temporary contract durations (see, 
Rebollo 2010). 
19 For instance, a worker starting employment with 6 months of insured employment earned in a previous job spell would 
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comparing these two cases it is possible to check whether the timing of the layoff is related to the 
date of entitlement to UI benefits. These figures show that although the date of entitlement to UI 
benefits might influence the timing of layoffs, the timing of quits appears to be independent of this 
influence. The spikes in exit through layoff at month 12 are much sharper for the first of the above 
groups than for the second, but no such difference is observed at months 3 and 6. Moreover, the rate 
of voluntary exit from employment is similar for both groups. 
Turning our attention to the sample of unemployed workers, we now present the plots of outflow 
from unemployment as a function of elapsed duration of unemployment for the subsamples of 
workers who received UI benefits and for workers who did not (Figure 3), taking into account recall 
versus new job entry transitions. Some points are worth noting. Firstly, the outflow rate from 
unemployment decreases more steeply over the unemployment spell for non-receivers. Hence, as 
shown in the literature, workers having received UI benefits face longer periods of unemployment 
than other workers. Secondly, the hazard rate from unemployment varies according to whether or 
not the spell ends in recall, which calls for a different specification for each type of transition. 
Observation of benefit receivers shows that the exit rate from unemployment is steeper for new job 
entrances than for recalls. This difference might be linked to lower job search intensity in workers 
expecting to be rehired.  
To show that the UIS also affects the timing of the exit from unemployment and that the effect 
varies with the type of transition, we compute the outflow from unemployment for UI receipts with 
two PBDs: four and six months (Figure 4). If the PBD does not affect the timing of exit from 
unemployment, then there should be no relevant differences between recalls and new job exit rates. 
Two main points can be drawn from Figure 4; i) that the involuntary unemployment hazard rate 
increases around the time of benefit exhaustion; ii) it has a different slope between recalls and new 
job entrances. Specifically, for recalls the unemployment hazard rate increases just prior to UI 
benefit exhaustion, whereas for new job entrances such increase takes place after benefit 
exhaustion.  
This statistical analysis provides a benchmark for the more complex econometric model that 
follows and enables us to carry out some basic consistency checks. In general, examination of the 
empirical hazard rate does not reveal the causal effects of the ER on duration of employment or the 
impact of the PBD on duration of unemployment. Nevertheless, this previous statistical analysis 
reveals that the UIS may affect unemployment and employment durations and that this influence 
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5 The  Econometric  Model 
To analyze the effects of the UIS on employment and unemployment duration, we estimate a 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model (MMPH) using the timing-of-events approach 
formalized by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003). Our MMPH model considers five events (i) 
employment spells ending through layoff; (ii) employment spells ending through a quit; (iii) 
involuntary unemployment spells ending in recall; (iv) involuntary unemployment spells ending in 
entry into a different firm; (v) voluntary unemployment (or quit) spells ending in recall or entry into 
a different firm
20.  
Assuming, for reasons of tractability and interpretation, that the hazard rates are proportional, and 
given the characteristics of the dataset, this paper uses discrete time duration models, in which the 
proportional hazard assumption implies that each hazard h
s
k(j) {s=initial state; k=destination state; 
j=duration} takes the complementary log-log form (Jenkins, 2005). Thus, the general specification 
of the hazard rate to be estimated is as follows:  
1.            /,,, 1 e x pe x p
ss s s s s
kk k k k k k k k k hj z x d z j x j d j j              (2) 
We define five sets of explanatory variables. The first contains the individual economic incentives 
embedded in the UIS {z(j)}, that is, PBD for individuals who are involuntarily unemployed and ER 
for those in jobs. In both cases, we measure the effect of these parameters distinguishing by the type 
of contract. We also include the wage -in the previous job for the case of unemployment spells-, as 
a proxy of the UI benefit level. Notice that these economic incentives are omitted in the estimation 
of the quit hazard rates
21. The second is a set of observed individual and job control variables {x(j)} 
such as age, nationality, total labour market experience, part-time job, hired by a temporary help 
agency, type of contract, sector of activity, firm size, job qualification, firm ownership structure, 
etc. The third set contains observed aggregate variables {d(j)}, to control for aggregate and regional 
demand side effects, such as the quarterly regional unemployment rate, the quarterly growth rate of 
production and quarterly dummies. In the fourth, the term {(j)} stands for the integrated baseline 
hazard. The fifth covers unobserved individual characteristics {
s
k,}, assumed to be specific to the 
origin and destination states. Notice that the consideration of the unobserved heterogeneity term is 
especially relevant in this framework. Firstly, we have multiple spells which raises the possibility of 
selection biases: the workers who have multiple employment spells may be a non-random sample. 
                                                 
20 Due to small sample issues, for voluntary unemployment spells we make no distinction between recall and entry into a 
different firm. In fact, less than 6% of voluntary unemployment spells end in recall. 
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Secondly, in the present study, the level and availability of UI benefits depends on workers´s 
employment histories. To the extent that employment histories are driven by unobservables, this 
may introduce dependence between UI benefits and unobservable heterogeneity biasing the 
estimation of the UIS effects.  
Apart from the assumption of proportionality, the specification of each hazard rate is highly 
flexible. There are no parametric restrictions on the effects of spell length, since duration 
dependence is defined as a monthly step function. The UIS parameters are also modelled as dummy 
variables and many of the remaining individual and job variables are dummy-coded to overcome 
arbitrary functional form restrictions.  
Several characteristics of the database and model specification have shown to be relevant to identify 
separately the transition pattern arising from unobserved heterogeneity, the form of true duration 
dependence and the causal effects of the UIS on spell duration. Mainly, they are random variation in 
the observed moment of spell transition
22 (Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003), multiple spells
23 
(Gaure et al., 2007), lagged variation in the exit rates
24 (Van den Berg and Van Ours, 1994,1996), 
and variation in lagged explanatory variables
25(Brinch, 2000). Hence the mixed proportional 
hazards assumption is not crucial in the present analysis.  
Notice that the identification of the effects of the UIS parameters on spell duration does not rest 
exclusively on cross-sectional variation but also on longitudinal variation. An important source of 
identification of the effect of the ER parameter on employment transitions is its dependence on total 
employment rather than time in current job. That is, people enter employment spells with different 
labour histories, and thus have accumulated different numbers of weeks of insured unemployment 
from past employment spells. Similarly, we identify the UI benefit exhaustion parameter from the 
fact that the PBD varies among workers with different accumulated amounts of job tenure. Hence, I 
can compare the probability of exit from unemployment for two workers who have both received 
benefits but have different PBD.  
                                                 
22 For instance, the existence of time variation at the onset of each spell ensures that people with exactly the same spell 
lengths have been exposed to different macroeconomic conditions earlier in the spell and hence to different selection 
forces. 
23 Comparison of the total number of spells with the number of individuals reveals that multiple spells have a non-trivial 
impact within the sample.  
24 The basic idea is that the conditional expectation on unobserved heterogeneity (conditional on observed individual and 
job characteristics, spell duration and aggregate variables) depends on the exit rate affecting the earlier part of the spell, 
while true duration dependence does not The higher the past exit rates, the higher the selection in any given spell duration 
and the lower the expected value of the unobserved covariate.  
25 Brinch (2000) proves that variation in covariates over time combined with covariates across individuals is sufficient for 
non-parametric identification of structural duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity without the assumption of 
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To estimate this discrete-time duration model, we construct a panel data set such that the spell 
length of any given individual determines a vector of binary responses (see Jenkins 2005). Let yik be 
a binary indicator variable denoting transitions to potential destination states upon exit, i.e. yik=1 if 
individual  i transits to state k and zero otherwise, and let Yi be the complete set of outcome 
indicators available for individual i (multiple-spells). The contribution to the likelihood function 
formed by the event pattern of a particular individual, conditional on the vector of unobserved 
variables νi=( ν1,ν2, ν3, ν4, ν5) can then be formulated as: 
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Where 
s
jks  takes value one if the individual transits from state s to state k during the period j and 
zero otherwise. We introduce unobserved heterogeneity non-parametrically by means of the non-
parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NMPLE). In practice, this implies that the vectors of the 
unobserved attributes specific to each type of transition are jointly discretely distributed, the number 
of mass-points being determined by adding location vectors until it is no longer possible to increase 
the likelihood function (Heckman and Singer, 1984; Gaure et al, 2007). Assuming that the 
unobserved covariates are jointly discretely distributed with Q number of support points, the data 











          ( 4 )  
where {νl,ql}, l=1….L, are the location vectors and probabilities characterising the heterogeneity 
distribution. Notice that, unobserved heterogeneity is a source of interdependency between the 
hazard rates because the unobserved variables specific to each transition state might be correlated. 
These mass points (or combinations of mass points) and their associated probabilities are estimated 
together with the other parameters of the model. Since each hazard rate contains a constant term, for 
identification purposes, the unobserved heterogeneity is modelled by normalizing the first 5-tuple of 
location parameters to zero so that the estimated coefficient for the remaining unobserved types of 
individuals denotes the deviation from the constant term. For the estimation procedure, the 
probabilities ql are specified as logistic
26 probabilities
27.  
                                                 
26 This means that probabilities can be reduced but never set exactly to zero. 







   18
6 Estimation  and  Results 
The estimated model contains a large number of parameters, most of which are included solely for 
control purposes and are unimportant for the topics discussed in this paper. Table 2 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of the variables considered in the estimation. Hence, although the full results 
are reported in Table 3, they are not discussed in the text. The focus in this section is on key results 
regarding the impact of the UIS on employment and unemployment duration
28. The results are 
presented in terms of individual parameter estimates (relative hazard rates) and some post-
estimation exercises. Unless otherwise specified, all the estimated exit probabilities were evaluated 
at the mean of the regressors.  
Overall, the estimation of a MMPH model for employment and unemployment transitions that 
explicitly considers layoff versus quit transitions and recall versus new job entry, respectively, 
shows its relevance in the significant differences between the effects of the explanatory variables on 
each hazard rate. For the same reasons, the separate estimation of voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment spells also proves relevant.  
The likelihood function for the MMPH model obtained their maxima at three mass-points in the 
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. These support points were robustly identified on the basis 
of a large number of estimators with different starting values. The results are highly robust as long 
as the number of support points lies between 2 and 3
29. This may imply that the information content 
in the data relating to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term is sufficient to ensure 
robust identification of the structural duration dependence in the hazard rates as well as the effects 
of the UIS on spell duration. In the final specification, unobserved heterogeneity is responsible for a 
substantial degree of variation in all the estimated hazard rates. The relation between the 
unobserved characteristics affecting each type of unemployment spell with the employment hazard 
depends on the type of the worker. Nevertheless, the general results show that dynamic selection 
effects point that workers who tend to have long employment spells will also tend to have short 
unemployment experiences. At the end of the section we briefly discuss the importance of 
considering this dynamic selection effect in order to correctly measure the effect of the variables we 
are interested in.  
                                                 
28 Although we make little comment about the voluntary unemployment hazard rate, it is included in the estimation to 
avoid dynamic sample selection biases.  
29 We also have tried to estimate de model with four points of support but convergence was not achieved in any of the 
estimations. This lack of convergence was due to the fact that some parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution became too large (i.e, the unobserved heterogeneity term for the exit rate from employment due to layoff). We 
estimated the model again fixing the constants and though convergence was achieved, the parameters of interest remained 
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Duration dependence is modelled with a step function. For every hazard rate, we include separate 
dummy variables for each month from the first to the twelfth. For the rest, we build aggregate 
intervals
30. These intervals are 13-15, 15-18, 19-23, 24, 25-30, 31-35, 36, > 37 for the employment 
hazard rate and 13-15, 15-18 and > 19 for the involuntary unemployment hazard rate. The only 
interval for the voluntary unemployment hazard rate is >13. This flexible specification of the 
duration dependence term enables us to track duration dependence stemming from selection effects 
or unobserved individual effects. More importantly, this flexible specification should avoid any 
influence of the duration dependence behaviour on estimation of UIS parameters.  
Before presenting the results for the impact of the UIS on employment and unemployment duration, 
it is worth highlighting some results regarding the different patterns of duration dependence 
observed in the estimated hazard rates. Firstly, estimated hazard rates indicate that the pattern of 
duration dependence differs strongly across the different types of transitions considered in the 
analysis. The estimated layoff hazard rate displays positive duration dependence during the first 
year of the contract and subsequently turns negative. It also shows spikes at specific durations, the 
largest at months 6 and 12. The estimated quit hazard rate is low and remains fairly constant 
throughout the spell. The estimated recall hazard rate exhibits negative duration dependence, as 
documented by previous researchers. In contrast to previous research, we find that the new job 
hazard rate also displays negative duration dependence, albeit of a lesser magnitude.  
6.1  The Incidence of the UIS on Employment duration 
The empirical analysis presented in this section is based on the idea that the UIS might affect the 
timing of involuntary exit from employment. Using on-the-job search models (Juradja, 2003) one 
can argue that, in the presence of demand fluctuations and firm-specific human capital, it will be 
optimal for the firm to layoff those workers who are entitled to UI benefits and recall them as the 
benefits approach exhaustion. One could also argue that people with loose attachment to the labour 
market will be the most affected by the entry requirements of the UIS (Baker and Rea, 1998). This 
last idea supports the need to estimate the incidence of the UIS taking into account the type of the 
contract held by the worker. Our basic distinction is between temporary and permanent contracts. 
We capture the effects of qualification for these benefits with a set of time-varying explanatory 
variables for different levels of entitlement. The first dummy variable, entitlement, takes value one 
at the month the qualifying period is fulfilled and zero otherwise. This last variable picks up any 
                                                 
30 Initially, we specified one dummy variable for each month. However, due to scarcity of observations for long-term 
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peak in the employment hazard rate in the first month of UI benefit entitlement. We then allow for 
the effects of the length of the available entitlement, conditional on the worker being eligible, by 
adding a step function to the length of entitlement, grouped as follows: between 1-4 months, 
between 5-8 months, and between 9-12 months, after the qualifying period is fulfilled. This last set 
of dummy variables is relevant because potential benefit duration when unemployed increases as 
the worker accumulates months of employment. Notice that our focus is on the effect of UIS on job 
separations, and not on the issue of seniority. The point at which the worker fulfils the entry 
requirement is based on the length of total employment spells in the base period and does not 
depend on the duration of a specific worker-firm employment relationship.  
As can be seen from Table 3 (Part 1), the set of variables that describes the entitlement effect tend 
to be statistically significant for both contract types. One useful way of illustrating the impact of the 
entry requirement on layoff and quit hazard rates is to plot them against the benefit qualifying 
period. This information is depicted in Figure 5. The figures show that, the impact of the UIS on 
employment duration varies with the degree of attachment to the labour market as it is stronger for 
females and workers holding temporary contracts than for male workers holding permanent 
contracts (see also Table 4). With the exception of male workers on permanent contracts, the layoff 
rate displays a spike at the point where the worker qualifies for benefits, whereas the quit hazard 
rate hardly varies with this parameter at any point. The sharpest spikes are found for female workers 
with temporary contracts for whom the layoff hazard increases by 0.65 percentage points when 
qualifying for benefits –compared to the layoff hazard rate one month before benefit expiration- and 
fall by 2.29 percentage points afterwards –compared to the layoff hazard rate at the month of 
benefit expiration-  (see Table 4).  
To correctly assess the importance of the effects of the entry requirement on the layoff and quit 
hazard rates, it is necessary to point out the important difference in the magnitude of the hazard 
rates between the two types of transitions and two types of employments. Figure 6 combines the 
estimated effects of the UIS and spell duration, in order to illustrate how the monthly transition 
probability pattern varies depending on the timing of the worker’s qualification for UI benefits. We 
depict the layoff hazard rates associated with eligibility taking place at two different months of the 
current contract: 6
th (i.e the worker has already accumulated six months of employment previous to 
the current spell) and 12
th. For instance, at the 6
th month the female permanent worker, who 
qualifies for UI benefits faces a layoff hazard rate of 1.69% at the moment of qualifying for UI 
benefits and then this drop to 0.31% one month afterwards. On the contrary, at the 6
th month, if the 
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month) and 0.24% (one month after). The estimated layoff hazard rate for a female temporary 
worker increases from 12.29% to 13.48% due to the above mentioned qualifying effect.   
The results presented so far reveal a significant effect of UI benefits on layoffs that is not found for 
quits, suggesting that employers could be involved in the timing of layoffs. Recall that firms face no 
experience rating of any kind. In these circumstances, firms and workers may jointly time layoffs to 
“play” the UIS as some theoretical models have already pointed out (Juradja, 2002) Alternatively, 
one could argue that from the firm’s perspective it may become less costly to fire a worker entitled 
to UI benefits since such a worker may have less incentive to contest dismissal than one who faces 
having no income while unemployed. The worker can, for instance, agree to refrain from going to 
court to fight the dismissal in exchange of not being laid off before the entitlement period. One 
could also argue that firms may class worker departures as “layoffs” to avoid the label of 
uncooperative employer or to reduce other job separation costs. In all cases, the estimated effect of 
the qualifying period on the timing of the layoff appears to reflect moral hazard problems on both 
sides of the market.  
The incidence of the UIS on employment duration seems to be stronger for the case of temporary 
workers than for the case of permanent ones. From the perspective of the firm, different ideas can 
support this result. Firstly, the lower dismissal costs associated to temporary contracts may explain 
this large difference. Also, the differences in individual productivity associated, for instance, to 
different levels of specific human capital can also explain the observed difference.  
6.2  The Incidence of PBD on Unemployment Duration 
The specification of the involuntary unemployment hazard
31 rate includes a step function to control 
for the number of months of UI benefit remaining grouped as follows: more than 4 months, 2 to 3 
months, 1 month, 0 months (named the exhaustion effect). We use the first set of time dummies to 
control for the effect of receiving UI benefits and allow this effect to be heterogeneous depending 
on the months remaining before exhaustion. One could argue that the worker´s search effort will 
increase the closer is the month of benefit exhaustion. From the firm´s perspective, assuming as 
given this behaviour of the worker, the probability of re-hiring will also increase as the month of 
exhaustion of benefits gets closer being this effect stronger for workers with strong attachment to 
the labour market. We use another step function to control for the months following benefit 
                                                 
31 In this section we will focus on the results for the involuntary unemployment hazard rate. The inclusion of the voluntary 
hazard rate in this estimation is justified to control for selection effects but none of the benefit variables are included in 
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exhaustion grouped as: 1 month, 2 to 3 months, more than 4 months
32. We use this second set of 
time dummies to measure the effect of having received the UI benefits. In this way we can capture 
the behaviour of UI benefit receivers over the entire unemployment spell. As in the estimation of 
the employment hazard rate, all these variables are interacted with the type of contract though in 
this case it refers to the contract held in the previous job. In general terms, all these variables are 
statistically significant (see Table 3 Part II), which suggests that unemployment benefits affect the 
timing of the outflow from unemployment. They show that, on average, current receipt of benefits 
causes a reduction of more than 60% in the transition rate out of unemployment.  
The common finding that the hazard rate rises as benefit exhaustion approaches (Meyer, 1990; 
Meyer and Anderson, 1990; Roed and Zhang, 2003) is also obtained in this estimation. The results 
show that the exhaustion effect is important irrespective of gender, type of contract or type of 
transition. This result immediately suggests that the net effect of the UIS on unemployment and 
employment duration depends crucially on the length of the treatment period, that is, the PBD. 
Notice, however, that the estimated model allows us to move further as it shows that the impact of 
the UIS on the probability of exit from unemployment differs according to whether or not the 
worker returns to the previous firm as well as depending on the type of contract. To illustrate the 
different patters obtained, Figure 7 display the recall and new job hazard rates in relation to the time 
remaining before the exhaustion of benefits and the time following their exhaustion. To 
complement the above-mentioned figures, we display in Table 5 the variation in percentage points 
of the estimated hazard rate of exit around the time of exhaustion relative to the previous month. 
Basically, our results call into evidence that the behavioural impacts of UI benefits are not the same 
for recall and new job entry and that they depend on the degree of attachment to the labour market.  
As for the employment spells, the incidence of the UIS seem to be stronger for worker with loose 
attachment to the labour market. That is, these effects are larger for female and temporary workers 
than for male workers holding a permanent contract.  
One interesting difference worth to notice arises looking at the timing of the effect of the UIS on the 
unemployment exit probability by type of contract and type of transition. The recall hazard rate for 
workers who previously held a permanent contract, displays the largest spike just one month prior 
to benefit exhaustion. For instance, the recall hazard rate increases by 2.74 and 2.21 percentage 
points for females and males permanent workers respectively just one month before exhaustion –
                                                 
32 We compute these sets of dummies by first calculating the PBD for each individual and then, for each unemployment 
spell duration, the number of months remaining before UI benefit exhaustion and the number of months following benefit 
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compared to the hazard rate two months prior to expiration-, while at the month the benefits run out 
the recall hazard rates hardly varies –compared to the hazard rate one month prior to expiration-. 
Notice the importance of this effect since the recall hazard rate increases by more than two times 
(from 1.02% one month before benefit expiration to 3.23% at benefit expiration) in the case of 
males and more than five times in the case of females (from 0.54% one month before benefit to 
3.28% at benefit expiration). The new job hazard rate for permanent workers also starts increasing 
one month prior UI benefit exhaustion but it reaches its maximum when benefits are exhausted. For 
instance, one month prior to exhaustion the new job hazard rate increases by 5.6 and 4.4 percentage 
points –compared to the hazard rate two months prior to expiration-, for females and males 
permanent workers, respectively, meanwhile, at the time of the UI benefits exhaustion, this 
variation increases to be 6.2 and 8.8 percentage points for the same workers groups.  
Nevertheless, as stated above, the largest spikes are obtained for temporary workers and they take 
place at the time UI benefits run out. For these workers, the recall hazard rate increases by 6.65 
(from 5.4% to 12.0%) and 3.91percentage points (from 4.8% to 8.7%) for males and females 
workers respectively while the new job hazard rate increases by 10.96 (from 12.5% to 23.5%) and 
8.48 percentage points (from 9.7% to 18.2%) for the same workers group. Notice that since the 
hazard rates for temporary workers are the largest ones, these last effects are also the most relevant 
from the economic point of view.  
To better illustrate the different behaviour of the monthly transition probability pattern between 
recall and new job entry, Figure 8 combines the estimated effects of benefit exhaustion and 
unemployment spell duration. We display each hazard rate in relation to unemployment duration for 
a worker with a PBD of six months. These figures confirm the ideas put forward previously. The 
spike in the recall hazard rate is concentrated at exhaustion of benefits for temporary workers, and 
just before that for those on permanent contracts. For the new job hazard rate, the spike is 
concentrated at exhaustion of benefits.  
In conclusion, we present evidence that the economic incentives explaining unemployment duration 
may differ according to whether the shift to unemployment is due to a layoff or a quit and whether 
the nature of the layoff is temporary (ending in recall) or permanent (ending in new job entry). 
From our results one could argue that cutting the entitlement period reduce unemployment duration 
and consequently induce more employment. Nevertheless, we have also shown that these effects 
can not be solely attributed to worker’s behaviour. In particular, recall unemployment spells should 
not be explained only by job search behaviour but also by firm incentives (i.e., implicit contracts 
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6.3 Some  Sensitivity  Analysis 
After commenting the main results it is worth noting that we have carried out a sensitiveness 
analysis using different distributional assumptions for the unobserved heterogeneity terms. We have 
proceed as follows. First, we estimate both employment and unemployment competing risks models 
separately and without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Secondly, we estimate separately 
each of these models but adding a 2-tuple distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity for 
employment and unemployment competing risk models and allowing the unobserved factors in the 
employment equation -layoff and quit hazards- to be correlated as well as those in the 
unemployment equation -recall and new job entry hazards. Thirdly, we control for potential 
selection bias into multiple spells and states by estimating the employment and unemployment 
hazards jointly, as described in the econometric section, allowing for a full correlation structure of 
the unobservables. Introducing unobserved heterogeneity as well as estimating jointly employment 
and unemployment transitions was strongly supported by the estimated sample likelihood. Besides 
parameters estimates, basically the pattern of duration dependence and UI benefits parameters, were 
also notably affected. This indicates that dynamic selection effects are relevant in measuring true 
duration dependence and, more importantly for the aim of this paper, in estimating the effects of the 
UIS on job turnover. In Tables 6 and 7 we compare the estimated incidence of the UIS on the 
corresponding hazard rates for the three model specifications considered. The largest differences are 
found for the recall and new jobs hazard rates. Basically, we obtain that without controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity and dependence between labour states, the researcher does not control 
properly for dynamic selection effects biasing the estimated effects of PBD on the exit probability 
from unemployment (see Table 7). 
7 Conclusions 
The current design of the UIS might provide incentives for workers and employers to increase 
labour market turnover. Firstly, if one assumes firms to know that unemployed workers with 
generous unemployment benefits will make a less intensive job search, in the presence of demand 
fluctuations and firm-specific human capital, it will be optimal for the firm to layoff those workers 
with high levels of unemployment entitlements and recall workers as they approach expiry of their  
benefits. An UIS without any form of experience rating might foster this type of incentives. 
Secondly, unemployment benefit receivers’ exhibit higher reservation wages and lower search 
effort than non-receivers, resulting in a lower exit rate from unemployment and longer 
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as the value of being unemployed decreases, such that the marginal benefit of the job search 
increases and the reservation wage declines, leading to a higher exit rate.  
The study reported in this paper reveals that at the point where the employee qualifies for 
unemployment benefits there is a spike in the layoff hazard rate, but none in the quit hazard rate. 
Hence, the UIS appears to have a negative effect on employment duration while increasing 
unemployment incidence. We also find a strong impact of the UIS on unemployment duration. The 
recall and new job hazard rates increase notably around the time of benefit exhaustion. 
Interestingly, the incidence of the UIS on employment and unemployment transitions is the largest 
for women and temporary workers, that is, for workers with loose attachment to the labour market 
and who suffer the largest turnover rates in Spain. Another interesting difference that emerged in 
the analysis is that the spike in the recall hazard rate for permanent workers takes place just one 
month before the exhaustion of unemployment benefits.  
Hence, the results found show that workers and firms seem to have some influence on the timing of 
the outflow from both employment and unemployment and use it to their advantage whenever the 
current characteristics of the UIS allow. However, these incentives might generate excessive labour 
market turnover, with shorter employment spells and longer unemployment spells. Notice that the 
importance of these results rests on the fact that the UIS seems to reduce the time spent in 
employment throughout an individual’s working life both directly increasing the probability of exit 
from employment and indirectly increasing unemployment duration. These findings need to be 
considered in the Spanish economy, in which over 80% of newly-signed contracts are temporary 
and more than 30% of unemployed workers return to their previous firm.  
Given these results, a potential reform of the UIS addressed to reduce the average unemployment 
duration and the unemployment rate should consider both sides of the labour market. In one side, 
the current design of the UIS distorts firm’s hiring and firing decisions. On the other side, it also has 
behavioural consequences on the worker’s decisions.  
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2.   Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Overview of recorded events/outcomes 
 Females  Males 
Sample of Employment Spells    
Completed Spells    76.2% (13.5)*  75.5% (15.6) 
Percentage ending in:    
Layoffs   80.4% (13.3)  75.4% (15.7) 
Quits   19.6% (14.5)  24.6% (15.1) 
    
Sample of Involuntary Unemployment Spells    
Completed Involuntary Unemployment Spells   90.0% (7.4)  86.8% (6.3) 
Percentage ending in:    
Recall   45.2% (3.7)  34.8% (3.4) 
Different firm   52.8% (7.4)  65.2% (5.3) 
    
Sample of Voluntary Unemployment Spells    
Completed Voluntary Unemployment Spells
 33  94.8% (4.5)  90.4% (3.5) 
* (Mean duration in months) 
                                                 





   29



















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Tenure (Months)











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Tenure (Months)
layoff-case 1 quit-case 1
layoff-case 2 quit-case 2
 
* Case 1= The qualifying period at the beginning of the current employment spell was zero; Case 2= The qualifying 
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Figure 4: Unemployment Hazard Rate for UI benefits receivers with two competing risks: recall versus new job entry  Case 1: worker´s 
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Table 2: Main Sample Statistics 
    Men    Women     









              
Age 32.2  31.2  27.8  31.1  31.0  27.4 
Experience (years)  12.8  8.3  4.3  10.9  7.4  4.4 
Individual Characteristics
Inmigrant 9.3%  10.7%  21.1%  4.2%  4.4%  9.9% 
  Receive Assistant Benefits    6.8%  0.6%    9.4%  0.5% 
Job Characteristics              
  Part-time 7.8%  16.1%  27.8%  24.9%  32.4%  48.7%
Job Qualification  High  37.9%  20.9%  18.5%  43.3%  25.0%  21.9%
 Medium  33.7%  32.9%  32.3%  32.1%  35.6%  35.6%
 Low  28.4%  46.2%  49.2%  24.6%  39.3%  42.5%
Sector of Activity  Construction  19.2%  23.6%  22.1%  2.8%  2.4%  2.3% 
 Industry  21.9%  16.7%  11.2%  11.3%  11.8%  7.1% 
 Service  59.0%  59.7%  66.7%  85.9%  85.8%  90.7%
Firm Size  > 50 Employees  33.8%  11.0%  22.8%  37.1%  31.0%  27.0%
 50-20  Employees  12.9%  16.4%  11.4%  10.9%  10.3%  9.5% 
 20-5  Employees  17.6%  46.0%  16.9%  15.4%  15.0%  14.6%
 <5  Employees  35.7%  11.0%  48.9%  36.7%  43.7%  48.9%
Public Firm    6.4%  -10.2  1.6%  13.1%  14.2%  2.9% 
Permanent Contract    62.3%  15.6%  27.1%  59.7%  16.2%  -0.921
Permanent Contract (discontinuous)  0.5%  1.8%  0.5%  1.9%  4.0%  1.4% 
Temporary Help Agency    9.1%  7.6%  5.9%  16.1%  18.0%  5.4% 
Aggregate Variables              
Regional Unemp. Rate (quarterly)  11.4% 10.8%  10.0%  10.9%  10.6%  9.9% 
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Table 3: Results of the MMPH Model: Part 1: Employment Hazard Rate 
    Men      Women     
    Layoff  Quit    Layoff   Quit   
   Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s 
                  
Age (years/10)  0.462  26.3  0.372 11.6 0.310  19.3  0.076  0.1 
Experience (years/10) -0.734  -40.6  -1.493 -32.2 -0.621 -26.4 -1.336 -25.0 
Individual 
Characteristics 
Inmigrant -0.713  -14.4  -0.218 -1.2  -0.459 -13.3  0.031  2.5 
Job Characteristics                  
  Part-time 0.339  9.2  0.566 15.7 0.151  10.8  0.473  15.7 
Job Qualification  High  -0.175  -9.2  -0.158 -4.3  -0.150 -8.7  -0.280  -8.1 
  Medium  -0.681 -25.9 -0.703 -15.7 -0.489 -23.2  -0.715  -17.4 
Sector of Activity  Construction  -0.244  -6.5  -0.220 -6.3  -0.309 -6.7  -0.363  -4.1 
 Industry  -0.165  0.7  -0.487 -12.2 0.032  0.4  -0.462  -8.9 
Firm Size  50-20 Employees  -0.013  1.9  0.048 1.4  0.061  2.4  0.035  0.7 
 20-5  Employees  0.067  4.4  0.167 4.0  0.126  5.6  0.099  2.5 
 <5  Employees  0.206  8.1  0.295 8.6  0.150  8.2  0.184  5.7 
Public  Firm    -0.315 -10.2 -1.326 -10.4 -0.354 -7.4  -1.029  -8.3 
Permanent  Contract    -2.950 -65.8 -1.304 -20.1 -3.082 -76.0  -1.054  -14.9 
Permanent Contract (discontinuous)  0.003  1.0  -0.897 -5.4  -0.214 -5.5  -0.443  -4.6 
Temporary Help Agency    0.235  4.9  -0.083 -4.1  0.148  8.9  -0.348  -4.9 
Aggregate Variables                  
Regional Unemp. Rate (quarterly)  -0.298 -13.5  -0.678 -19.4 -0.281 -13.5 -0.724 -17.8 
GDP growth rate (quarterly)  -0.724  -3.1  -0.394 -0.9  -0.483 -3.1  -0.213  -0.1 
Quarter 1    -0.181  -9.2  -0.069 -1.7  -0.150 -9.6  0.069  6.3 
Quarter 2    -0.128  -6.0  -0.076 -1.8  0.205  24.2  0.159  5.2 
Quarter 3    -0.028  -0.7  0.054  2.2  0.103  14.2  0.257  2.2 
                
2 0.753  25.8  0.743 14.0 0.718  21.7  0.749  14.6 
3 0.976  38.5  0.636 9.4  1.053  31.3  0.693  12.4 
4 0.516  16.0  0.527 6.5  0.490  8.8  0.521  8.4 
5 0.329  9.7  0.432 4.0  0.300  2.1  0.400  5.9 
6 1.356  48.8  0.529 3.4  1.417  38.0  0.444  6.2 
7 0.509  13.8  0.476 3.0  0.479  5.5  0.429  5.7 
8 0.592  20.4  0.526 3.3  0.722  11.3  0.556  7.5 
9 1.023  48.8  0.565 3.2  1.560  33.0  0.644  8.3 
10 0.641  31.5  0.553 3.0  1.153  18.0  0.664  8.1 
11 0.858  19.5  0.614 3.7  0.798  8.9  0.585  6.7 
12 1.722  59.4  0.606 2.3  2.054  46.7  0.632  6.5 
13-14 0.742  17.1  0.513 2.2  0.719  6.3  0.651  7.7 
15-18 0.573  15.4  0.506 2.3  0.549  3.3  0.644  8.7 
19-23 0.571  14.0  0.333 -0.6  0.508  2.1  0.490  6.2 
24 1.006  22.3  0.435 0.3  1.380  13.9  0.584  3.8 
25-30 0.380  14.1  0.415 0.6  0.571  2.9  0.450  5.0 
31-35 0.845  14.9  0.348 -0.3  0.709  5.1  0.345  3.1 
36 0.315  7.9  0.102 -1.2  0.791  3.0  0.805  4.1 
Baseline hazard 
(months) 
>37 0.532  7.9  0.469 0.7  0.611  1.8  0.610  3.7 
UIS covariates                  
Entitlement Effect (months)                
0 0.177  1.3  0.149 0.9  1.021  14.0  0.031  0.2 
1-4 0.319  4.6  0.305 3.1  0.259  3.3  -0.033  -0.5 
5-8 0.480  6.9  0.466 5.9  0.408  5.1  0.058  0.4 
9-12 0.344  5.3  0.481 4.3  0.353  4.1  0.017  0.0 




>16 0.335  7.0  0.449 6.3  0.374  7.4  0.004  -0.3 
0 0.068  5.9  -0.070 -0.7  0.102  2.3  -0.160  -1.6  Entitlement 
Effect*Temporary 
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5-8 -0.222  -7.0  -0.167 -2.6  -0.314 -9.8  -0.316  -4.3 
9-12 -0.254  -8.4  -0.265 -3.1  -0.371 -10.7  -0.452  -5.3 
Contract 
13-16 -0.323  -10.5  -0.277 -3.2  -0.440 -12.3  -0.363  -4.4 
  >16 -0.441  -24.7  -0.054 -1.0  -0.574 -23.6  -0.458  -8.4 
Potencial UI benefits  Low 0.194  8.6  0.004  3.1  0.239  10.9  0.011  0.2 
  Medium 0.104  5.9  -0.143 -5.0  0.177  8.6  0.014  0.3 
  High -0.041  -1.6  -0.307 -2.0  -0.055 -0.5  -0.101  -1.9 
                 Unobserved 
Heterogeneity
34 
Constant (Type I)   -3.730 -58.6  -3.897 -15.3 -2.592 -92.5  -2.405  -51.5 
 Type  II    -0.315 -6.1  -0.605 -7.1  -1.122 -24.2  -1.239  -18.9 
 Type  III    1.023 19.2  0.991  12.9 -1.309 -31.2  -1.510  -20.7 
Note 1: For female workers Pr(Type I)=37.2%; Pr(Type II)=31.8%; Pr(Type III)=21.6%;  For male workers Pr(Type I)=27.1%; 
Pr(Type II)=47.4%; Pr(Type III)=25.4%  
Note 2: The reference person for the unemployed: Full time native worker with a temporary contract of one month, low wage 
and low job qualification with a previous unemployment duration lengthier than 18 months, hired in a big private firm at the 
service sector; The reference person for the Unemployed: Full time native worker with un unemployment spell of one month and 
whose previous job characteristics were a temporary contract with low wage and low job qualification and hired in a big private 
firm at the service sector. 
                                                 
34Notice that given the approach used to estimate the unobserved heterogeneity terms, the constant parameter of the 
employment hazard rate for workes type II and type III will be the sum of the estimated constant term corresponding to type 
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Table 3: Results of the MMPH Model: Part 2: Involuntary Unemployment Hazard Rate 
    Men       Women      
    Recall  Diff. Firm   Recall  Diff. Firm   
                  
   Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s 
Age (years/10)  -0.093 -3.5  -0.239  -8.6  0.072  9.0  -0.318  -15.2  Individual 
Characteristics 
Experience (years/10)  0.386  4.6  0.289  5.3  0.225  2.5  0.174  1.6 
  Inmigrant 0.419  4.2  -0.354  -13.0  0.079  4.1  -0.119  -4.6 
                 Job Characteristics 
Part-Time Job  -0.076 -2.5  0.414  -17.0  -0.065  -1.9  0.246  11.1 
Job Qualification  Medium  0.130  2.0  0.141  5.9  0.063  0.0  0.170  7.7 
 High  0.187  3.6  0.074  2.1  0.355  11.2 0.227  7.8 
Sector of Activity  Construction  0.508  12.4  0.276  10.1  -0.282  -3.3  -0.046  -0.6 
 Industry  0.397  9.8  0.086  1.8  0.431  12.3 -0.126  -5.5 
Firm Size    -0.112 -3.2  0.079  2.7  -0.239  -6.6  -0.029  -0.7 
   -0.298 -6.6  -0.027  1.1  -0.307  -10.2  -0.086  -2.9 
   -0.366 -12.4  0.041  3.6  -0.505  -20.4  -0.042  -0.3 
Public Firm    -0.413 -4.0  -0.763  -13.4  -0.208  -2.0  -0.709  -15.3 
Temporary Help Agency  0.629  11.4  0.243  2.3  0.370  7.3  0.200  3.3 
Permanent Contract    -1.802 -14.9  0.090  5.6  -2.462  -28.3  0.192  3.9 
Permanent  Contract  (discontinuous)  0.859  14.6 -0.578 -7.8 0.496  10.0 -0.638 -10.2 
Aggregate Variables                  
Regional Unem. Rate (quarterly)  0.265  8.5  -0.110  -8.3  0.112  4.0  -0.288  -14.2 
Growth Rate of the GDP (quarterly)  0.439  0.2  0.360  1.0  0.741  1.6  0.795  1.8 
First Quarter    -0.062 -1.4  -0.067  -1.2  -0.019  -1.5  -0.019  -1.4 
Second Quarter    0.142  2.6  0.252  2.5  0.027  2.5  0.180  2.1 
Third Quarter    0.367  4.5  0.147  4.1  0.588  6.3  0.169  5.4 
Baseline hazard (months)               
2  -0.578 -22.7 -0.480  -7.7 -0.235  -8.4 -0.090  -4.3 
3  -0.647 -22.8 -0.466 -14.0  -0.182  -6.3 -0.152  -6.2 
4   -0.838 -24.2  -0.432  -16.7  -0.520  -14.8  -0.245  -8.4 
5   -0.810 -21.4  -0.330  -16.4  -0.683  -16.7  -0.270  -8.4 
6   -0.671 -19.0  -0.426  -17.6  -0.476  -12.3  -0.344  -9.6 
7   -0.996 -21.4  -0.556  -16.2  -1.034  -18.3  -0.445  -11.0 
8   -1.050 -20.4  -0.604  -14.7  -0.970  -16.3  -0.393  -9.3 
9   -0.248 -13.0  -0.643  -12.9  -0.502  -9.6  -0.286  -6.6 
10   -0.426 -13.1  -0.768  -13.6  -0.883  -13.1  -0.376  -7.9 
11   -1.295 -16.5  -0.162  -14.4  -1.603  -16.1  -0.542  -10.1 
12   -1.742 -15.2  -0.295  -14.1  -1.938  -15.8  -0.536  -9.6 
13-15   -1.957 -19.5  -0.396  -18.2  -2.084  -20.3  -0.572  -12.4 
> 15    -2.161 -22.7  -0.407  -23.1  -2.140  -24.1  -0.649  -15.4 
UI benefits covariates               
Permanent Contract*                  
>4 -1.301 -10.8  -1.208  -17.8  -0.260  -3.2  -1.239  -18.8 
2-3 -0.738 -5.9  -1.012  -8.9  -0.330  -3.5  -0.815  -8.2 
Remaining months 
before exhaustion of 
UI benefits 
1 0.429  2.5  -0.542  -3.7  1.493  15.8 -0.248  -2.0 
Exhaustion Effect  0  0.433  1.8  0.056  0.4  1.409  8.5  0.175  1.5 
1 -0.577 -1.9  -0.855  -5.3  -0.061  0.4  -0.734  -5.2 
2-3 -0.688 -2.3  -0.795  -5.5  0.526  2.4  -0.820  -6.1 
Months beyond the 
exhaustion of the UI 
4-5 -1.410 -2.9  -1.144  -7.6  0.245  1.1  -1.060  -8.0 
Temporary Contract*                  
>=4 -1.148 -16.3  -0.710  -15.6  -0.742  -15.1  -0.632  -13.7 
2-3 -1.205 -13.4  -0.677  -11.8  -0.772  -11.7  -0.557  -9.7 
Remaining months 
before exhaustion of 
UI benefits 
1 -0.842 -7.3  -0.465  -6.6  -0.578  -6.6  -0.446  -5.8 
Exhaustion   0  0.016  0.9  0.250  3.5  0.050  0.6  0.247  3.6 
1 -1.182 -8.9  -0.710  -9.2  -1.198  -10.5  -0.668  -8.9 
2-3 -1.372 -10.2  -0.705  -9.8  -1.061  -10.4  -0.882  -12.2 
Months beyond the 
exhaustion of the UI 
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Low -0.075 -0.6  0.068  1.2  -0.107  -2.0  0.072  1.1  Potencial UI benefits 
Medium 0.190  2.4  0.118  2.1  -0.152  -2.7  0.126  2.0 
  High 0.244  4.1  0.196  4.7  0.197  3.4  0.226  4.1 
Unemployment 
Assistance Benefits     1.265  11.7  1.047  17.5  1.268  29.8 0.200  3.3 
                 Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
Constant (Type I)  -3.614 -18.9 -1.666 -11.9  -2.963  -80.9 -1.291  -41.0 
 Type  II  2.412  21.3  1.412  21.2  1.233 25.9 1.098  27.7 
 Type  III  1.262 13.3  0.520  8.9  -0.579  -2.7  -0.200  0.9 
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Table 3: Results of the MMPH Model: Part 3: Voluntary Unemployment Hazard Rate  
    Men  Women  
   Coef.  t-s  Coef.  t-s 
Individual Characteristics  Age (years/10)  -0.107 -4.1  -0.191  -6.7 
  Experience (years/10) 0.330  10.5  0.285  7.6 
  Inmigrant 0.364  10.7  0.293  6.5 
Job Characteristics      
  Part-Time Job  -0.301 -10.0  -0.239 
-8.6 
Job Qualification  Medium  0.020  0.6  0.089  3.0 
 High  -0.091 -2.6  0.014  0.5 
Sector of Activity  Construction  0.124  4.3  -0.223  -2.4 
 Industry  0.043  1.0  -0.020  -0.5 
Firm Size    -0.067 -1.5  -0.038  -0.6 
   0.064  1.8  0.038  1.0 
   0.032  1.2  -0.063  -1.7 
Public Firm    -0.488 -3.8  -0.422  -3.9 
Temporary Help Agency    -0.043 -0.6  0.267  3.8 
Permanent Contract    -0.036 -1.4  0.015  0.5 
Permanent Contract (discontinuous)  -0.162 -0.9  0.178  1.7 
Baseline hazard (months)  2 -0.406 -13.7  -0.406  -10.7 
  3 -0.580 -15.9  -0.581  -12.9 
  4 -0.829 -18.2  -0.854  -15.8 
  5 -1.011 -18.5  -0.964  -15.7 
  6 -1.091 -17.7  -0.947  -14.3 
  7 -1.150 -16.8  -1.052  -14.2 
  8 -1.113 -15.4  -1.234  -14.5 
  9 -0.855 -12.3  -0.928  -11.6 
  10 -0.911 -11.7  -0.996  -11.4 
  11 -1.080 -11.9  -1.088  -11.2 
  12 -1.185 -11.5  -1.297  -11.6 
  > 13  -1.463 -22.7  -1.449  -22.0 
Aggregate Variables          
Regional Unem. Rate (quarterly)  -0.003 -0.1 -0.095 -2.2 
Growth Rate of the GDP (quarterly)  0.736  1.2  0.838  1.4 
  Constant (Type I)  -1.252 -9.6 -1.188 -7.4 
 Type  II  0.803 13.4  0.746  25.6 
  Type III  0.020  2.7 0.562 5.1 
  Type IV  -0.069 -0.5  -0.660  -0.2 
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Table 4: Variation in the employment hazard rate relative to the entitlement for UI benefits (percentage points) 
      
       Type of Transition 
  Type of 
Contract 
Entitlement Effect  Layoff Quit 
When qualifying for benefits   0.55*  0.01 
After qualifying for benefits     
Between 1-4 months    -0.45**  -0.01 
Permanent  
Between 5-8 months     0.06**  0.02 
  Between 9-12 months   -0.02**  -0.01 
      
When qualifying for benefits  0.65**  -0.10* 
After qualifying for benefits     
Between 1-4 months    -2.29**  -0.05** 
Between 5-8 months     -0.04**  -0.03** 
Women 
Temporary  
Between 9-12 months     -0.26**  -0.06** 
        
When qualifying for benefits   0.05*  0.02 
After qualifying for benefits     
Between 1-4 months    0.04**  0.03** 
Permanent  
Between 5-8 months     0.06**  0.03** 
  Between 9-12 months     -0.05**  0.00** 
      
When qualifying for benefits   0.29*  -0.03 
After qualifying for benefits     
Between 1-4 months    -1.16*  -0.04* 
Between 5-8 months     0.02**  -0.04** 
Men 
Temporary  
Between 9-12 months     -0.11**  0.00** 
Note 3: ** The parameters associated to this effect are statistical significance at the 95% level; * The parameters associated to 
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Table 5: Estimated variation –percentage points- in the involuntary unemployment hazard rate relative to UI benefits 
exhaustion 
     Type of Transition 
     Recall  New  Job 
  Type of Contract  Exhaustion Effect    
One month prior to exhaustion  2.74**  5.68** 
UI are exhausted  -0.26**  6.27** 
Permanent  
One month following exhaustion  -2.31**  -11.30** 
      
One month prior to exhaustion  0.41**  0.96** 
UI are exhausted  3.90**  8.48** 
Women 
Temporary 
One month following exhaustion  -6.07**  -10.30** 
        
One month prior to exhaustion  2.21**  4.49** 
UI are exhausted  0.01**  8.84** 
Permanent 
One month following exhaustion  -2.05**  -12.07** 
      
One month prior to exhaustion  1.59**  2.23** 
UI are exhausted  6.65**  10.96** 
Men 
Temporary 
One month following exhaustion  -8.17**  -13.54** 
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Table 6: Comparing Results between different model specifications: Variation in employment exit probability relative to UI 
benefits (percentage points) 
  Permanent Contract  Temporary Contract    
  Model I  Model II   Model III  Model I  Model II   Model III 
 Women            
 Layoff               
When qualifying for benefits   0.57 0.64 0.55  0.62  0.98  0.65 
After qualifying for benefits   -0.48 -0.51 -0.45  -1.87  -2.85  -2.29 
 Quit           
When qualifying for benefits   0.03 0.01 0.01  -0.09  -0.11  -0.10 
After qualifying for benefits   0.02 -0.02 -0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.05 
 Men           
 Layoff           
When qualifying for benefits   0.05 0.04 0.05  0.27  0.32  0.29 
After qualifying for benefits   0.03 0.04 0.04  -0.96  -1.24  -1.16 
 Quit           
When qualifying for benefits   0.03 0.02 0.02  -0.04  -0.04  -0.03 
After qualifying for benefits   0.02 0.03 0.03  0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
Note 4: Model I: Duration Model without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity; Model II: Duration Model controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity (three support points) but assuming independence between labour market states; Model III: Duration Model controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity (three support points) and allowing for a full correlation structure between transitions and labour states.  
 
Table 7: Comparing Results between different model specifications: estimated variation (percentage points) of the 
unemployment exit probability relative to UI benefits exhaustion 
  Permanent Contract  Temporary Contract 
   Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IModel II Model III 
Women          
 Recall          
One month prior to exhaustion  1.17 2.59  2.74 0.62  0.74 0.41 
UI are exhausted  -0.28 -0.32  -0.26 1.82  4.14  3.90 
One month following exhaustion  -1.09 -2.28  -2.31 -2.84  -6.43 -6.07 
          
 New Job          
One month prior to exhaustion  2.86 5.34  5.68 0.57  0.88 0.96 
UI are exhausted  3.86 5.79  6.27 4.62  8.27 8.48 
One month following exhaustion  -5.89 -11.08 -11.30 -5.16  -10.59  -10.30 
          
 Men          
 Recall          
One month prior to exhaustion  1.48 2.76  2.21 1.21  2.17 1.59 
UI are exhausted  -0.40 0.11  0.01 2.99  7.61 6.65 
One month following exhaustion  -1.22 -2.42  -2.05 -3.34  -9.14 -8.17 
          
 New Job          
One month prior to exhaustion  3.10 4.17  4.49 1.58  2.00 2.23 
UI are exhausted  6.62 7.50  8.84 6.80  9.27  10.96 
One month following exhaustion  -8.07 -10.23 -12.07 -8.45  -11.60  -13.54 
Same as note 4 
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